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Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with
consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes
formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness –
the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued
that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside
and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined
(embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and
useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none
phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages,
can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such
conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or
artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily
processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced
recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes
possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article,
then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the
range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are
limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information
is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local
limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented
nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an
abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified
state of play within consciousness studies itself.
Keywords: taxonomy of consciousness, graded consciousness, extended consciousness, sensorimotor
consciousness, integrated information, individuated information, subjectivity
“What do I call ‘information that it is raining’? (Or have I only information of this information too?)
And what gives this ‘information’ the character of information about something?”
(Wittgenstein, 2009, I. §356)
Introduction
Over the last few decades, the research into consciousness carried on in both cognitive neuroscience
and the philosophy of mind has led to the emergence and consolidation of dozens of divergent
meanings for terms central to the topic (Brook and Raymont, 2006; Brook, 2008; Jonkisz, 2012).
This polyvalence should surely count as surprising: after all, the resolving of basic conceptual issues
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would normally be expected to precede the experimental phase
of an investigation. With consciousness studies, though, it would
appear that questions about the meaning even of the central term
itself get to be posed alongside those that pertain to its empirical
status. Taking into account this issue alone, the formulation of an
abstract concept of consciousness unifying the diﬀerent branches
of consciousness research – the overriding aim of this paper –
would seem to represent an urgent theoretical imperative.
An initial step in the direction of meeting that challenge,
proposed by the current author, was to assemble a stable
framework of connections linking together the numerous
varieties of consciousness currently encounterable in science:
phenomenal and access, creature and state, sensorimotor
and perceptual, reﬂexive consciousness and self-consciousness,
minimal and normal, impaired and altered, clouded and epileptic,
visual and auditory, bodily and social, animal and machine,
etc. This was accomplished in the form of a proposed fourfold
taxonomy (Jonkisz, 2012), by showing that virtually all such
varieties can be understood as constituted with reference to
just four aspects of the phenomenon: namely, its being dually
accessible (both from the inside and from the outside, subjectively
and objectively), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered),
bodily determined (depending on physical states of an organism),
and useful (possessing diverse pragmatic functions). Ultimately,
the varieties of consciousness were accommodated within a
taxonomy of epistemic kinds, semantic orders, physiological
state categories, and the pragmatically diﬀerentiated types of
consciousness supported (see Table 1).
The current article argues that these four taxonomic aspects
directly correspond to general or fundamental features of the
phenomenon. It is also claimed that the broad picture arising
from this taxonomy (which includes sensorimotor states within
the scope of consciousness) implies a graded rather than an all-or-
none nature for the phenomenon. Brief analysis of the empirical
status of the graded versus all-or-none (or dichotomous)
approaches prompts the conviction that the former is empirically
justiﬁed, and preferable, when interpreting certain data and
medical cases. However, the gradational approach may prove
more problematic methodologically (e.g., contrastive analysis
is more diﬃcult to obtain; see Baars, 1994; Frith et al., 1999;
Overgaard, 2004), and, more importantly, it may generate certain
counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. Major
instances of the latter arise from the fact that in most such
theories graded consciousness is signiﬁcantly extended globally
(attached to signiﬁcantly less developed organisms or even to
artiﬁcial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-
level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according
to a recently highly acclaimed theoretical model tailored to the
gradational scenario, information integration theory (IIT; Tononi,
2004, 2008, 2010; Koch, 2012; Tononi and Koch, 2014), even
such primitive artiﬁcial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule
amounts of consciousness. Hence, one of the major theoretical
challenges of this article is to establish reasonable limitations for
how extended a graded form of consciousness could be.
The article concurs with the general assumption of IIT that
all conscious states are informational states (diﬀerentiated and
TABLE 1 | The four-fold taxonomy of consciousness.
Aspects of consciousness Characteristic Examples
(Epistemic)
Kinds of consciousness
Subjective Cognized from first-person perspective (experienced) phenomenal, first-personal, qualitative, experiential
Objective Cognized from third-person perspective (observed) access, psychological, third-personal
(Semantic)
Orders of consciousness
Sensorimotor Refers to the environment. Enables basic, non-random motor
responses utilized, e.g., in space navigation, maintaining
equilibrium, etc.
Sensorimotor, ecological self, proto-self
Perceptual Refers to percepts. Enables identification of the objects of
perception and adjusting motor actions
perceptual, inner sense, first-order representation,
primary
Meta-perceptual Refers to perception. Enables multimodal identification of the
source of information and adjusting perceptual processes
HOT, HOP, reflexive, introspective. . .
Self-consciousness Refers to the perceiving subject. Enables identification of one’s
own body and the ownership of the perceptual processes
self-consciousness, extended, reportable, secondary
Meta-self-
consciousness
Refers to one’s own self. Enables identification of an owner as
an experiencing subject and formulation of the self-concept
symbolic self-concept, recursive self-consciousness
(Physiological)
States of consciousness
Wakeful Occur in physiologically normal wakefulness NWS, creature, vigilance
Sleep-states Occur in physiologically normal sleep sleep, REM-consciousness, NREM. . .
Impaired Occur in neurological and psychological disorders (e.g., brain
lesions)
LOC, minimal, blurred, clouded, delirious etc.
Altered Occur in ‘non-standard’ conditions (induced accidentally or
intentionally)
ASC, hypnotic, trance, mindfulness meditation, etc.
(Pragmatic)
Types of consciousness
Source-defined Distinguished according to the type of receptor or sensory
system (visual, olfactory,. . .)
visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory,
proprioceptive
Use-defined Distinguished according to the type of situation it is used in social, temporal, body, motor-skill, emotional, facial, etc.
System-defined Distinguished according to the type of subject in which it occurs animal, human, artificial, machine.
*Revised version of table introduced in Jonkisz, 2012.
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integrated), but above and beyond this the very notion of
information will itself be analyzed from a biological perspective
(since the phenomenon of consciousness has so far only
been known to exist in vivo). As a result, information will
be characterized as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered,
and subjectively grounded – i.e., individuated. The notion
of individuated information not only fosters a naturalized
explanation of subjectivity (potentially rather signiﬁcant in its
own right), but also enables one to impose limitations on
conscious systems (the global limitation postulate). Subsequently,
it will be argued that since not all informational states accessible
within a given organism or system are ultimately conscious (see
Mudrik et al., 2014), certain additional selection mechanisms
should be speciﬁed. Because there is no agreement over which
of the cognitive functions, neuronal mechanisms, or brain
areas are fully responsible for states of consciousness (e.g.,
attention, memory, language, or certain so called NCC’s, may
each of them be neither suﬃcient nor necessary; see Noë
and Thompson, 2004; Lamme, 2006, 2010; Hohwy, 2009),
the article seeks to specify which of the general features of
consciousness is most likely responsible for shaping the selection
process. Consequently, one sort of limitation imposed on states
of consciousness (the local limitation postulate) will be based
on an empirically justiﬁed hypothesis about the pragmatically
functional or action-oriented nature of the selection processes
themselves. Finally, taking both local and global limitations
as its basis, an abstract concept of consciousness will be
arrived at. This conception enables one to link up together
certain promising aspects of prominent neurocognitive models
(e.g., IIT, GW, GNW) and philosophical ideas (e.g., aspects
of ecological, embodied and enactive conceptions), and as
such will hopefully contribute to a state of play within
consciousness studies that will be (at least conceptually) more
uniﬁed.
The initial stages of the present enquiry seek to give
an adequate characterization of the fundamental features of
consciousness. This is followed by analysis of the empirical status
of the contrasting all-or-none (dichotomous) and gradational
approaches to that phenomenon. Then come sections aimed at
setting reasonable global and local limitations on how extended
graded consciousness can be. This leads on in turn to the
formulation of an abstract concept of consciousness presented in
the last part of the article.
Fundamental Features of Consciousness
We come to know about consciousness in two diﬀerent
ways: by experiencing our own conscious states, and via
something else – namely, observations of certain behaviors and
neuronal processes presented by conscious agents. The diﬀerence
between such subjective and objective forms of knowledge is
essentially epistemic (hence the category of ‘epistemic kinds
of consciousness’ in the abovementioned, previously proposed
taxonomy; see Jonkisz, 2012,Table 1). Philosophers used to argue
that only consciousness and the phenomena it consists of (i.e.,
thoughts, perceptions, feelings, emotions, desires, sensations,
etc.) are subjectively experienced – hence the thought that asking
‘What-is-it-like to have it?’ in connection with anything else
is absurd. In a similar sense, all or most conscious states are
thought to be accompanied by experiential qualities or qualia
(Nagel, 1974; Jackson, 1982; Dennett, 1988; Searle, 1992, 2000a,b;
Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1995, 1996; Kriegel, 2006). As a result,
the subjective (qualitative, experiential, phenomenal) nature of
consciousness stands exposed as absolutely the hardest, and
supposedly most enigmatic, aspect of the problem – one that
engenders the so called explanatory gap faced by scientiﬁc
approaches, and also perhaps even an ontologically unbridgeable
gulf (Wittgenstein, 2009; McGinn, 1989; Chalmers, 1995, 1996;
Levine, 1983, 2001; Bayne, 2009). Consequently, the distinctive
feature of the phenomenon is often taken to be either our split
access to it or the fact of its possessing an exclusively subjective
character, where such considerations are also then viewed as
furnishing a basis for antireductionist lines of argumentation
and the drawing of dualistic consequences. (Such epistemico-
ontological inferences have been present in the philosophy of
mind at least since the time of Descartes’ distinction between
res cogitans and res extensa; see Northoﬀ and Musholt, 2006.)
In this article, only the former strategy will be embraced, as the
present author holds that dual epistemic accessibility does indeed
help to distinguish consciousness from various other phenomena
observed by science, and so should be regarded as indicative of
one of its fundamental features.
Consciousness may be described as a relation between a given
subject and some particular information or content he or she is
aware of or simply possesses. In this sense, it is ‘directed toward’
something or simply ‘refers to’ or ‘is about’ something. It is
with much the same considerations in mind that consciousness
is also labeled either transitive (Rosenthal, 1986) or intentional
(Searle, 1992, 2000a). Yet the latter notions mainly ﬁgure
in philosophical debates, where ‘intentionality’ in particular,
thanks to its ubiquitous deployment across phenomenology,
analytical philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind,
now seems too complex and ambiguous to be useful (see
Pierre, 2003; Siewert, 2006; Lycan, 2014). In this context it is
worth adding that consciousness may also refer – and quite
often does – to its own content, in that it ‘reﬂects’ this in
higher-order content, creating a hierarchy of orders (in the
sense that a given subject X may not only be ‘conscious of
Y,’ but also ‘aware of being conscious of Y’). The hierarchy is
to a certain extent visible in so called higher-order theories of
consciousness, or HOT’s (see Rosenthal, 1986; Gennaro, 2005),
in various forms of self-directed perception (introspection or
inner sense; see, e.g., Lycan, 1996), and in cases of metacognition
(see Cohen and Dennett, 2011; Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012;
Mealor and Deines, 2013; Shea et al., 2014). More abstract
orders of consciousness are known to be correlated with higher
levels of information processing in the brain, such as engage
progressively more complex neuronal structures and enable
the production of more complex forms of behavior: from
basic sensorimotor reactions, perceptual diﬀerentiations and
multimodal coordination to self-identiﬁcation, verbal reports and
the formulation of an abstract notion of selfhood (Hochstein
and Ahissar, 2002; Crick and Koch, 2003; Baars, 2012; Palmer
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and Ramsey, 2012; Baars et al., 2013; Windey et al., 2013,
2014). Simplifying the idea somewhat, consecutive orders of
consciousness may refer directly to the environment, to the
objects perceived, to the perception itself, to the very perceiver,
and/or to the self-conscious subject (see Table 1 and, for more
detailed description, also Jonkisz, 2012). The semantic aspect
of hierarchical referentiality counts as yet another fundamental
feature of the phenomenon.
There exists an extensive body of scientiﬁc evidence directly
correlating diﬀerent states of consciousness – alongside their
divergent impairments and various other alterations – with
speciﬁc physiological and behavioral parameters as exhibited by
some given conscious agent or other (e.g., Tart, 1969; Teasdale
and Jennett, 1974; Bogen, 1995; Metzinger, 2000; Alvarez-Silva
et al., 2006; Moller et al., 2006; Kokoszka, 2007; Schnakers, 2008;
van Gaal et al., 2011; Långsjö et al., 2012; Panagiotaropoulos
et al., 2012; Kouider et al., 2013). In this sense, the claim
that all conscious states are determined by the interaction
between ‘working’ structures or subsystems of a given organism’s
body and changing environmental stimuli is quite natural. The
fact that consciousness is bodily determined counts as another
fundamental feature of the phenomenon. The chain of causal
eﬀects that are known to inﬂuence consciousness is traced
back and forth, from the bottom–up molecular and neuronal
activations, to the general neurophysiology and, further, to
any biological processes or behavioral activities presented by
a given conscious body, or speciﬁc environmental conditions
it is faced with. Limiting ourselves to the biological body
proves problematic when taking into account the possibility
of non-biological conscious systems like those ﬁguring in the
debate over artiﬁcial or machine consciousness (Hollande, 2003;
Torrance et al., 2007; Kurzweil, 2012; O’Regan, 2012). It is rather
implausible to call states presented by those systems biological or
physiological, yet their consciousness, if they possess it, should
share the same fundamental features. In the light of this, it
would be less question-begging to say that states of consciousness
depend on a variety of physical or structural changes that go on
within a conscious system as it interacts with its environment.
On the other hand, however, the four state categories featured
in the taxonomy (i.e., wakeful, sleep, impaired, and altered states
of consciousness, see Table 1, Jonkisz, 2012) relate directly to
the phenomenon of consciousness as it is currently studied in
humans or animals, so some reference to the physiology (as
a causal intermediary in the larger causal chain) would seem
natural.
It seems that consciousness must have been an advantageous
trait where the adaptive strategies of our ancestors were
concerned (see, for example, Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013). From
this perspective, the evolutionary advantageousness of the ability
to be conscious may be characterized as usefulness in action, in
the sense that consciousness fulﬁlls certain pragmatic functions –
e.g., enabling one to react appropriately, make speciﬁc choices,
solve new problems, change one’s mind, or plan actions in
advance, anticipate developments, etc. It is worth noting here
that the notion of pragmatic function has much in common with
Millikan’s (2004) idea of a proper function, as the latter may
also be characterized as a form of biologically justiﬁed utility
common to the creature and its ancestors. One might say that
the functions of consciousness are structured and limited by at
least three factors: the source of information (type of receptor,
sensory, and memory systems), the conditions of application
(whether the conscious information is applied to social life,
spatial movement planning, or to temporal segregation of events,
etc.), and the type of creature or system considered conscious
(whether it is human, animal, or machine) – hence the taxonomic
division into source, use, and system-deﬁned types of consciousness
(see Table 1, Jonkisz, 2012). On top of these, usefulness in
action, deﬁned in terms of pragmatic functionality, can then be
considered a fourth fundamental feature of the phenomenon of
consciousness.
Of course the facts, features, and characteristics ascribed to
consciousness are highly varied: for example, that it feels a
certain way, is phenomenally structured, is integrated, is a higher-
order or self-representational state, is generated by recurrent
processing in the thalamocortical structures, is associated with
reverberating activations of the parieto-frontal areas, that it
enables one to behave appropriately, adapt to new situations,
learn, understand emotions, diﬀerentiate, and choose, etc.
(Rosenthal, 1986; Baars, 1994; Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1995;
Lycan, 1996; Damasio, 1999; Edelman, 2003; Tononi, 2004;
Gennaro, 2005; Kriegel, 2006, 2007; Lamme, 2006; Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011, etc.). It is hoped, however, that all of those just
mentioned, as well as most other characteristics, ultimately fall
into one of the four categories described above, as they concern
facts that will prove to be either epistemic, semantic, bodily
physiological, or functional. The four fundamental features that
enable us to describe consciousness as being dually accessible,
(hierarchically) referential, bodily determined, and useful in action
may therefore be seen as together furnishing an abstract meta-
characterization of the phenomenon. Somewhat more precisely,
we might say that according to this view, consciousness is an
objectively observable and subjectively experienced phenomenon
that enables a given agent to utilize increasingly abstract contents.
The increasing complexity of the contents and functions of
consciousness (depicted in the taxonomic hierarchy of orders –
see Table 1) is known to be correlated with the higher levels
of information processing in the brain that engage progressively
more complex, more wide-ranging neuronal structures and
signiﬁcantly more synchronized connection patterns (Hochstein
and Ahissar, 2002; Crick and Koch, 2003; Baars, 2012; Baars
et al., 2013; Windey et al., 2013, 2014). From this perspective,
consciousness shows up as a graded rather than all-or-none
phenomenon (with such gradedness being visible both in the
referential contents of consciousness and in the underlying
neuronal processes). If certain sensorimotor processes are to be
included within its scope (as is assumed in the taxonomy), then
the phenomenon also shows up as vastly extended among living
creatures (since non-random sensorimotor activity is exhibited
even by very simple organisms). Just how great the range
of organisms is across which consciousness may be said to
extend is something that is very much debated in the scientiﬁc
literature, with few wishing to limit subjective consciousness
to humans (Carruthers, 1998) and some ascribing it to quite a
variety of non-human animals (Griﬃn, 2001; Griﬃn and Speck,
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2004; Seth et al., 2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Boly et al.,
2013; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013), or even to artiﬁcial systems
(Hollande, 2003; Torrance et al., 2007; Kurzweil, 2012; O’Regan,
2012). Both the graded character and the range of extension
of consciousness are issues analyzed further in subsequent
sections here.
Dichotomous and Graded
Consciousness
In experimental practice a given subject is usually only deemed
conscious of certain sensory stimuli, perceptual contents,
emotions, thoughts, etc., when they (or it) can ‘prove it,’ either
through relevant and statistically signiﬁcant behavioral responses
or in the form of conclusive reporting of their own states. In
other words, consciousness is equated with either objectively
or subjectively measurable forms of awareness. The current
debate in science over the adequacy of objective versus subjective
measures of consciousness (Seth et al., 2008; Overgaard et al.,
2010; Sandberg et al., 2010; Szczepanowski et al., 2013;Wierzchoñ
et al., 2014) to some extent mimics philosophical arguments
over access versus phenomenal consciousness. Thus, if phenomenal
consciousness (accompanied by subjective qualia) is to indeed
be the main and most diﬃcult target of explanation, as some
philosophers insist (e.g., Nagel, 1974; Jackson, 1982; McGinn,
1989; Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1995, 1996; Levine, 2001; Kriegel,
2006; Bayne, 2009), then subjective measures would seem to
be fundamentally more adequate (Sandberg et al., 2010, 2011;
Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Peremen and Lamy, 2014). However,
as the methodologies for subjective measuring assume reportable
states to be decisive, consciousness may seem to be ‘switching
on’ from unconsciousness rather late in the process – i.e., not
until a given subject is actually able to present such metacognitive
reports. Although metacognition, unlike verbal reportability, is
not an exclusively human-related ability (Smith, 2009), it is
associated with sophisticated stages of information processing,
which makes the picture of consciousness appear to be almost
exclusively human-related and so rather rare in nature. Often
consciousness is viewed not just as coming into play quite late
on, but also as doing so suddenly – as an all-or-none dichotomous
neuronal and phenomenal event (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004;
Dehaene et al., 2006). The following sections aim to show
that the opposite view, according to which consciousness is a
non-dichotomous, graded phenomenon, and rather widespread
in the animal world, is not only well justiﬁed empirically
but also explanatorily advantageous (see also Overgaard et al.,
2006).
The view of consciousness as dichotomous has garnered
substantial support across the ﬁeld (e.g., Merikle and Reingold,
1998; Merikle et al., 2001; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Dehaene
et al., 2006; van Gaal and Lamme, 2012; Balconi and Bortolotti,
2013; Landry et al., 2014). There have also been experimental
attempts at showing that conscious and unconscious processes
are biologically ‘bifurcated’ in that they rely on diﬀerent
neurological mechanisms (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Brogaard,
2011; van Gaal et al., 2011; Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012). It
must also be acknowledged that within the currently prevalent
methodology of contrastive analysis (Baars, 1994; Frith et al.,
1999), it is much easier and more eﬀective in practice to
demonstrate major diﬀerences in neural functioning between
higher-order metacognitive states and certain lower-order non-
reportable states such as would be considered unconscious, than
to detect continuous, small changes, or to show ‘in-between’
states (Overgaard et al., 2006). Even so, the all-or-none picture
of consciousness itself is more likely to run into considerable
diﬃculties when it comes to interpreting experimental and
medical data. The following cases may be brieﬂy invoked
as furnishing pertinent examples: interpretations of Libet-type
experiments as examples of strictly unconscious, non-voluntary
decision making (Libet, 1985; Soon et al., 2008); cases where
the blindsight phenomenon is treated as genuinely unconscious
perception (Ro et al., 2004; Brogaard, 2011); situations where
non-human creatures unable to produce higher-order states are
said to be totally bereft of consciousness (Carruthers, 1998);
assessments of divergent impaired states of consciousness in
the dichotomous scenario – according to Giacino (2005), for
example, over just 12 years up to 41% of patients inhabiting
a minimally conscious state were misdiagnosed (see Schnakers,
2008). In all these cases it is debatable whether we are dealing
with an absence of consciousness in its entirety or just of
certain aspects or higher forms of it (e.g., the ability to
report, to discriminate objects, to recall and react accordingly;
see below). Positing a dichotomous split between conscious
and unconscious processes may also entail certain debatable
metaphysical consequences. For example, if a given state does
not count as conscious at all until it has become the object of
some higher-order or metacognitive state, consciousness may
start to look like an extra added property – the sudden by-
product of unconscious brain processes, fromwhich emergentistic
or even epiphenomenalistic conclusions might then have to be
drawn. So called conceivability arguments involving hypothetical
zombie-creatures (observably identical to us but totally lacking
consciousness – see Kirk, 1974, 2005; Chalmers, 1996, 2002;
Stoljar, 2007) are clearly much more readily formulated in such
a context. With the all-or-none picture in mind, consciousness
is also more likely to be seen as a certain thing or entity
that is either possessed or not (as life was seen by vitalists) –
something which may eventually prompt one to embrace even
more radical dualistic consequences regarding its nature. (Amore
detailed discussion of the metaphysical consequences of the all-
or-none approach unfortunately lies well beyond the scope of this
article.)
Non-dichotomous approaches, such as portray consciousness
as a hierarchical or a graded process, are at least equally popular in
the current context of debate (Natsoulas, 1983, 1997a,b; Neisser,
1988; Cleeremans, 1994, 2011; Damasio, 1999; Cleeremans and
Jiménez, 2002; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Tononi, 2004, 2008,
2010; Morin, 2006; Overgaard et al., 2006, 2010; Seth et al.,
2008; Kouider et al., 2010; Nieuwenhuis and de Kleijn, 2011;
Koch, 2012; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013; Miller and Schwarz,
2014; Peremen and Lamy, 2014). What is more important,
though, is the high level of plausibility those conceptions have,
in the light of both considerable supporting evidence and of
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their explanatory advantages in respect of the interpretation
of experimental and medical data – both points to be brieﬂy
demonstrated below.
Miller and Schwarz (2014) review the number of behavioral
and neurophysiological studies providing extensive support for
the gradational view of consciousness, which the authors then
apply to the analysis of the decision making process. They
conclude that decisions are more likely to be reached in a gradual
process of evidence-accumulation involving ascending certainty-
levels (see alsoMele, 2010), and a gradually acquired awareness of
their being made, than they are to happen suddenly, as products
of totally unconscious brain activity with delayed, epiphenomenal
consciousness only being acquired later on in the process (Libet,
1985). The results ﬁts well with currently popular methodologies,
such as the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) proposed in (Ramsøy
and Overgaard, 2004), the experimentally supported continuum
of clarity levels described in (Overgaard et al., 2006, 2010),
post-decision wagering (Nieuwenhuis and de Kleijn, 2011), and
other similar strategies (Massoni et al., 2014; Wierzchoñ et al.,
2014).
Further evidence and arguments in support of a hierarchical
view of consciousness may be found in neurology, neuroanatomy
and psychiatry, as well as in evolutionary and developmental
approaches. Gradedness is clearly visible in the way the neuronal
processes associated with consciousness unfold. According to
the most common view, strong reciprocal connectivity between
thalamic nuclei (especially the intralaminar andmedial ones) and
the relevant cortical areas enhance gradually more synchronized,
more frequent and longer lasting activities in circuits connecting
more distant groups of neurons (see, for example, Edelman and
Tononi, 2000; Lamme, 2006; Edelman et al., 2011; Baars, 2012;
Baars et al., 2013; Saalmann, 2014). The experiments described
in Fleming et al. (2010) show signiﬁcantly higher introspective
accuracy in ratings of one’s own conscious decisions in subjects
whose brains possess a greater volume of gray matter in the
anterior prefrontal cortex region. Such sophisticated introspective
abilities, realized in the evolutionarily youngest parts of the
brain, may be viewed as representing the most advanced
grades of self-awareness, and also as revealing their phylogenetic
immaturity and phenotypic divergences in the human brain.
Gradedness is also visible in the descriptions of diﬀerent states
of impairment. In medical practice the range of impairments
and recovery prognoses are assessed against speciﬁed scales:
e.g., the Glasgow Coma Scale and its revisited version (GCS,
GCS-R), the Coma Recovery Scale and Revisited (CRS, CRS-
R), the Full Outline of UnResponsiveness scale (FOUR), or the
Wessex Head Injury Matrix (WHIM; see Giacino, 2005). Patients’
states are analyzed with respect to arousal level and behavioral
responsiveness, creating a list of successively diminished levels
of consciousness with minimal consciousness at the end of
the list, just before vegetative state and coma (Teasdale and
Jennett, 1974; Giacino, 2005; Schnakers, 2008). Other studies
where a non-dichotomous hierarchical approach would seem
particularly promising show, for instance, the following: that
the return from anesthesia also occurs in steps, with so called
primitive consciousness emerging ﬁrst (Långsjö et al., 2012);
that signs of diminished consciousness are revealed even in
severely damaged brains (Philippi et al., 2012); that the cerebral
cortex is probably not necessary for certain basic forms of
consciousness (Merker, 2007); that consciousness occurs, to
a certain degree, at diﬀerent developmental stages (Stuss and
Anderson, 2004; Zelazo, 2004); that even very young infants
might be perceptually conscious (Kouider et al., 2013); that
consciousness is not only a feature of the human mind, as
animal consciousnessmost likely extends beyond themammalian
kingdom (Lyvers, 1999; Griﬃn, 2001; Reiss and Marino, 2001;
Griﬃn and Speck, 2004; Seth et al., 2005; Legrand, 2007; Edelman
and Seth, 2009; Smith, 2009; Boly et al., 2013; Feinberg and
Mallatt, 2013).
Information integration theory, as developed recently by
Tononi (2004, 2008, 2010), Koch (2012), Tononi and Koch
(2014) is an abstract, theoretical model tailored to the gradational
scenario: “The IIT claims that consciousness is not an all-
or-none property, but is graded: speciﬁcally, it increases in
proportion to a system’s repertoire of discriminable states”
(Tononi, 2008, p. 236). Roughly speaking, according to IIT,
a given system is more conscious the more chunks of
information it is able to diﬀerentiate and bind together or
integrate, where “Integrated information () is deﬁned as the
amount of information generated by a complex of elements,
above and beyond the information generated by its parts. . .”
(Tononi, 2008, p. 216). Certain problematic consequences and
promising aspects of this model will be discussed in the sections
below.
Extended Consciousness and its
Limitations
On the basis of the evidence reviewed above, the hypothesis
that consciousness is acquired in a graded manner rather than
all at once deﬁnitely appears valid. If this is the case, it is also
likely that at least some of the processes traditionally deemed
unconscious rely on the same neurobiological mechanisms as
subsequent conscious processes (Peremen and Lamy, 2014),
being just an antecedent, lower-level, lower-order, degraded (etc.)
form of these. Such an extension of consciousness into processes
hitherto considered unconscious receives support, for example,
fromOvergaard et al. (2008), where the blindsight phenomenon is
described as a degraded consciousness or, evenmore directly, from
Holender and Duscherer (2004, p. 872), where a radical paradigm
shift is proclaimed by the statement that “. . .dual-process models,
which are based on both conscious and unconscious perception,
should be rejected in favor of the single-process conscious
perception model.”
Generally, it may be said that in gradational approaches
consciousness is most often extended below the level of reportable
andmetacognitive states, to the point where not only lower-order
perceptual processes, but also, sometimes, certain non-perceptual
processes are reckoned to lie within its scope. Indeed, the latter
is the case with this author’s own taxonomic hierarchy of orders
(Jonkisz, 2012), in which consciousness is extended beyond
perception toward sensorimotor processing. For example, when
a given creature eﬀectively avoids obstacles by utilizing visual,
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tactile, auditory or any other sensory information available in
the environment, such functioning might be regarded as an early
manifestation of consciousness. In performing such actions with
above chance eﬃciency levels, the creature must be in possession
of at least rudimentary sensorimotor information about the
object’s surface and location, and about its own body position:
on this basis alone it could be said that the creature possesses
ﬁrst-order consciousness of the environment and of its own
body, and this even if its conscious states are not available for
any higher-order monitoring processes (Kriegel, 2007; Jonkisz,
2012). The attribution of consciousness to certain lower-order
states may be called local extension. By analogy, global extension
would be an appropriate label to apply when consciousness
is being attached to signiﬁcantly less developed species than
humans or primates (Griﬃn, 2001; Griﬃn and Speck, 2004;
Seth et al., 2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Boly et al., 2013;
Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013).
In dichotomous approaches, not only are certain non-
reportable perceptual states regarded as unconscious
(Kihlstrom, 1987; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Dienes and
Scott, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2006; Scott and Dienes, 2008, 2010;
Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012; Landry et al., 2014), but also
certain higher-order processes sometimes get to be placed outside
of conscious awareness (van Gaal and Lamme, 2012). Having
excluded a great many states, it seems easier for such conceptions
to state what consciousness is not than to specify exactly what it
is. Meanwhile, in the non-dichotomous gradational views, such
as include a whole range of states into the conscious realm, the
opposite concern may emerge as equally problematic: namely,
the issues of how to determine which states are deﬁnitely not
conscious. Consequently, no matter which approach is at stake,
the methodology of contrastive analysis (Baars, 1994; Frith
et al., 1999) seems destined to suﬀer permanently within the
science of consciousness, as clear-cut contrasts and precise
conditions or strict deﬁnitions are still rather diﬃcult to obtain
there (Overgaard, 2004). In setting a deﬁnite metacognitive or
neuronal threshold for consciousness (represented, for example,
by reportable states or recurrent processing), dichotomous
approaches not only struggle to prove that this is the crucial
threshold, but also face the burden of providing us with an
unambiguous non-operational characterization of what, exactly,
it is that is added when the threshold ﬁnally gets crossed and
consciousness “switches on.” Such a deﬁnite borderline for
consciousness should be considered dubious on both neuronal
and phenomenal grounds: as was already mentioned, it is quite
likely that certain perceptual processes traditionally considered
unconscious in fact rely on the same neurological mechanisms as
those associated with consciousness (Peremen and Lamy, 2014),
while there is also strong experimental evidence for gradedness
in subjective ratings of conscious contents and decisions with
respect to awareness, clarity, certainty, or conﬁdence levels
(Overgaard et al., 2006, 2008, 2010; Mele, 2010; Nieuwenhuis and
de Kleijn, 2011; Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Miller and Schwarz,
2014; Massoni et al., 2014; Wierzchoñ et al., 2014). In seeking
to extend consciousness both locally and globally gradational
conceptions struggle, on the other hand, to give unequivocal
answers to a number of questions. Which stages of information
processing (metacognitive, perceptual, or sensorimotor) form
the ﬁnal frontiers of consciousness? What types of neuronal
activity (e.g., recurrent or feed-forward activations) and which
areas of the brain (e.g., only the corticothalamic complex, or
also certain limbic and midbrain regions) form the most basic
correlates of consciousness? Does consciousness occur only in
the mammalian kingdom or across all animal species? What
about even more primitive living systems, like plants or bacteria?
Could they possess any of its forms? And what about artiﬁcial
systems (Hollande, 2003; Torrance et al., 2007; Kurzweil, 2012;
O’Regan, 2012)? Could any sort of information be accompanied
to some degree by consciousness (Chalmers, 1995; Tononi, 2008;
Koch, 2012)?
Is it at all feasible to try to impose reasonable, empirically
validated constraints on how far graded consciousness might
extend? Or could it be that the only option that remains
when adopting the gradational approach is a radical extension
according to which almost all the information-bearing states of
all information-processing systems, either biological or artiﬁcial,
would be conscious to certain extent? The double-aspect principle
introduced by Chalmers (1995, 1996), and the IIT proposed by
Tononi (2004, 2008, 2010) and Koch (2012), have pursued just
this radical strategy. Chalmers (1996) claims that “. . .wherever
there is a causal interaction, there is information, and wherever
there is information, there is experience” [by ‘experience’
he means phenomenal consciousness]. He also believes that
“Experience is information from the inside; physics information
from the outside” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 297 and 305). According
to Koch (2012, p. 131)“[a]ny system at all that has both
diﬀerentiated and integrated states of information. . .” is more
or less conscious. As is commonly known, these theses result in
strikingly counterintuitive consequences, such as the attribution
of consciousness even to such simple artifacts as thermostats
or photodiodes: “Strictly speaking, then, the IIT implies that
even a binary photodiode is not completely unconscious,
but rather enjoys exactly 1 bit of consciousness” (Tononi,
2008, p. 236). Also rather unpopular are the metaphysical
consequences of the claims: i.e., certain forms of dualism or
panpsychism that lead to a reorganization of the ontological
structure of the universe with conscious information recognized
as another fundamental entity besides mass or energy (Chalmers
and Searle, 1997; Koch and Tononi, 2013; Searle, 1997,
2013a,b).
The authors of IIT have acknowledged the diﬃculties
involved, and have moderated certain aspects of their theory.
In particular, they propose a “set of postulates concerning
requirements that must be satisﬁed by physical systems to
account for experience” (Tononi and Koch, 2014, p. 4), but
Searle’s (2013b) common sense critique of the theory remains
sound, at least in some cases. At the same time, Searle
might well be wrong where the very notion of information
is concerned, this being for him something that cannot be
used “to explain consciousness because the information in
question is only information relative to a consciousness.”
Searle (2013b) seems to be operating with a rather naive or
colloquial conception of information (“. . .information is carried
by a conscious experience of some agent (my thought that
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Obama is president, for example). . .;” whereas Koch and Tononi
(2013) try to adapt the formal, quantitative conception to
the qualitative and uniﬁed character of conscious experience.
In IIT, information may be approximately described as ‘any
diﬀerence discernible from a perspective intrinsic to a given
system’: “Consciousness. . . is both integrated (each experience
is uniﬁed) and informative (each experience is what it is
by diﬀering, in its particular way, from trillions of other
experiences). IIT introduces a novel, non-Shannonian notion
of information – integrated information – which can be
measured as ‘diﬀerences that make a diﬀerence’ to a system
from its intrinsic perspective, not relative to an observer”
(Koch and Tononi, 2013). If we acknowledge the obvious
claim that consciousness consists of states that a given
system is able to diﬀerentiate from its intrinsic perspective,
then we must also agree that consciousness always carries
certain information (in the sense of IIT). Consequently, if all
conscious states are informational states, then IIT’s notion of
information would indeed appear like a good candidate for
the general characteristic of consciousness, contra Searle. On
the other hand, however, the fact that all conscious states
bear information does not itself entail that all informational
states are conscious – contra Tononi (2008, p. 236) and
Chalmers (1996, p. 297), for whom information or integrated
information is coextensive with consciousness. Such assumptions
“strongly violate our intuition. . .,” as they lead directly to the
attribution of consciousness to almost any system possessing
informational states – and thus support, in particular, the claim
that a thermostat or a photodiode “. . .feels like something. . .”
(Tononi and Koch, 2014, p. 7).
Information integration theory’s notion of integrated
information, speciﬁcally understood as a simultaneously
diﬀerentiated and uniﬁed state for a given system, ﬁts our
intuitions about consciousness, as it seems, indeed, to be
composed of such states. However, even if the claim that all
conscious states carry some information for the subject is
justiﬁed and true, it does not necessarily hold the other way
around – contrary to IIT, we claim that the question of whether
all integrated information is conscious remains to a certain
degree open. If we seek to claim otherwise, as IIT itself does
(Tononi, 2008), then the characterization of consciousness may
be threatened with circularity: ‘consciousness’ is deﬁned in terms
of ‘integrated information,’ ‘integrated information’ in terms of
‘diﬀerentiated and uniﬁed states,’ and ‘diﬀerentiated and uniﬁed
states’ in terms of being conscious. In fact, we may still ask
whether it is possible for a given state to be diﬀerentiated by a
given system, and perhaps integrated, but still not conscious.
(That is, we may ask whether it is empirically rather than logically
possible; language itself will not, after all, tell us anything new
about the real phenomena involved; see Chalmers, 2002). Koch
himself (in Mudrik et al., 2014) has recently softened his stance
and reconciled himself to the claim that this is indeed the
case, at least in four cases: when the spatiotemporal window for
processing is too narrow, when the level of semantic complexity
of the information is low, when sensory information need not
be detected multimodally, and/or when certain stimuli or states
are already well known and so not novel for the subject. If all
conscious states are integrated informational states, but not all
states of this sort are conscious, then information integration
is not suﬃcient for consciousness, although most likely it
is necessary. Therefore a theory construed in informational
terms will have to invoke additional selection mechanisms, or
spell out in some other way the special conditions suﬃcing
for consciousness to be present. Hopefully, such a theory will
prove feasible and potentially consistent with major empirical
ﬁndings without obliging one to relinquish the gradational
scenario.
The aim of the following sections is to place limitations on
what graded consciousness could amount to, thereby avoiding
the improbable consequences of IIT’s commitment to radical
extension, while nevertheless keeping the notion of ‘information’
in play – as one that remains promising where any general
characterization of consciousness is concerned.
Individuated Information and Global
Limitations
If all conscious states are indeed informational states (as was
argued above), then it could be worth looking more closely at
the nature of information itself. In the context of consciousness
studies, it seems reasonable to characterize information from
a naturalistic, biological perspective, since up to now the
phenomenon of consciousness has only been known to exist in
vivo.
Biological systems evolve in interaction with their
environment and with other creatures; as a result, their
bodies and bodily structures are attuned or sensitive to the
speciﬁc informational resources available in the ecological niche
of their ancestors (e.g., certain wavelengths of light, acoustic
frequencies, or chemicals (etc.) detected on the ground, in the
air, underwater, and so on). In this sense, it may be said that
the information accessible to a given creature is evolutionarily
embedded or phylogenetically determined – and, as far as we
know, it is also epigenetically modiﬁed across diﬀerent phenotypes
(Migicovsky and Kovalchuk, 2011). The ways in which available
information is interpreted by living creatures may also be
socially altered, in the sense of being slightly modiﬁed across
diﬀerent groups of individuals even within the same species:
e.g., variations in mating habits, ways of communicating danger,
ways of hunting, interacting in a group, speaking, etc. (Swaddle
et al., 2005). Moreover, the information actually utilized by
living creatures is always subjectively grounded or private, in the
sense of being determined by divergent subject-related factors.
It is encoded in unique and dynamically changing patterns of
neuronal activity, such as are modiﬁed by the actual physiological
state and/or speciﬁc behavioral habits formed during individual
histories (ontogenesis) and shaped by current environmental
or social engagements, as well as by the particularities of the
relevant location in space. The unique and private form of the
informational state a creature experiences will reﬂect all these
speciﬁc internal and external conditions – both those currently
aﬀecting the biological system at a given moment of time and
those that did so in the past.
Such a view partakes of certain important ideas endorsed
by ecological psychology. According to both Berker (1968) and
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Gibson (1979), cognition is always situated: i.e., it belongs to a
speciﬁc ecological niche and depends on ecological information
such as determines the set of possible actions (aﬀordances).
Perception, in this theoretical approach, is “based on [a given
organism’s] detecting information” (Gibson, 1979, p. 1). The
biologically focused stance presented here also has a lot in
common with the conceptions (Millikan, 1989, 2004, 2006)
has introduced. Her notions of ‘biological utility’ and ‘local
natural information’ also stress the importance of the usability
or applicability of the informational content determined by
environmental conditions, by evolution and by individual
histories. “The kind of knowledge that earthly creatures have
is knowledge applicable in the domains they inhabit, not
knowledge for arbitrary nomically possible worlds, nor for other
domains, regions or eras within the actual world” (Millikan,
2004, p. 9). Embodied and enactivist theories also point to and
stress similar aspects and determinants of the mind and of
consciousness: “consciousness is an achievement of the whole
animal in its environmental context” (Noë, 2010, p. 9). In
this context, see also (Varela et al., 1991; Clark, 1997, 2008;
Hurley, 1998, 2001; O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Thompson and
Varela, 2001; Noë, 2006; O’Regan et al., 2006; Engel et al.,
2013).
Within such accounts we see information being characterized
in the way that has been described here by this author
as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and subjectively
grounded (private). Consequently, the ways in which living
systems extract, store or interpret information are determined
by their evolutionary antecedents, by interactions with other
creatures, and by unique individual histories and actual
situations. It may be concluded, therefore, that the form of
information functionally relevant for a given biological system
is always individuated – with respect to just that very system.
Yet the philosophical implications of the latter statement are
surely fairly momentous, given the epistemological – or possibly
even ontological – consequences that may issue from it. In the
former case, it may be claimed that individuated information is
accessible only from-the-inside, from that system’s own point
of view, so that it is epistemologically subjective. If one pursues
the more far-reaching ontological implications as well, it may
be insisted that the information only exists inside the system
itself, making it ontologically subjective. (This is in fact the
main point of contention between Searle and Dennett; see
Dennett, 1991, 1993, 1995; Searle, 1992, 1995.) There is no
need to address that metaphysical issue here, as for current
purposes what is crucial is just the very notion of individuated
information. According to the conception set forth, information
functionally relevant for a given biological system is formed
in the unique and particular interactions occurring between
the system (e.g., its sensory organs located on its body and in
relevant areas of its brain) and its environment (e.g., photons,
sound waves, chemicals), or just between parts of the system
itself, taken in isolation (e.g., its memory subsystems, insofar as
these are able to induce certain states internally). Every aspect
of the whole formation process possesses its own subject-related
uniqueness: from the mere ability to move in certain ways, the
sensitivity of its sensory organs, the anatomical and physiological
characteristics of certain sensory areas, to its distinct location
in some quite speciﬁcally ordered spatial milieu at a given
moment of time and its individual engagements within a given
ecological niche. So we may declare individuated information to
be subject-related – or, simply, subjective (be it epistemologically
or ontologically so).
The evolutionary mechanisms inherited in the context of our
terrestrial ecology, and the complexity of the possible interactions
between individual entities within it, have resulted in an immense
diversity of unique biological systems. As far as we know, every
organism is indeed more or less diﬀerent. For example, even
monozygotic twins reared together are actually far from identical:
developmental changes are known to occur between them at
virtually every possible level, be it genetic, epigenetic, anatomical,
behavioral, etc. (Pfeﬀerbaum et al., 2004; Fraga, 2005; Ballestar,
2010; Maiti et al., 2011). The same goes for other natural and
artiﬁcial clones (Freund et al., 2013), as it is inevitably impossible
to duplicate all the environmental interactions and internal
bodily conditions involved in forming each individual phenotype
(at the very least, the exact locations in space of each of a given
pair of twins must permanently diﬀer, causing slight diﬀerences
in stimuli detection, and consequently also in the adaptive
plasticity of the processes occurring in sensory areas). Such
necessary individual diﬀerences, and the uniqueness of biological
systems, enable us to account for things like intrinsic perspective,
the ﬁrst-personal point of view, and the self, by furnishing us with
a natural source for these, and in fact this sort of naturalized
conception of subjectivity does seem well justiﬁed empirically.
Indeed, the major obstacle to creating artiﬁcial systems with
subjective points of view may well be the combining of these
complex biological factors responsible for inﬂuencing instances
of such naturally formed perspectivalness. Does this necessarily
mean that all artiﬁcial systems are immediately ruled out as
potentially conscious (from-the-inside)? Is the ‘information’
utilized by artifacts just observer-relative information, as Searle
(2013a,b) claims, being information just for us, whereas for
artifacts like computers it is just one more piece of binary code
being transformed into another? Such conclusions are certainly
rather tempting, but our aim here is not to analyze such issues
in any detail. We may conﬁne ourselves to remarking that it
does not seem fundamentally impossible for artiﬁcial systems
to individuate information and form private informational
states (O’Regan, 2012), though predicting whether it will ever
be feasible to construct such systems (e.g., guided by similar
biological principles of replication, adaptation, learning, etc.)
seems like an issue more suited to futurology. At the same time,
the ‘information’ processed by machines based on computational
(von Neumann) architectures – even ones as complicated as
modern supercomputers and expert systems – is rather more
repeatable than individuated. The situation is somewhat diﬀerent
when artiﬁcial neural networks are taken into account (Ferber,
1999), though, as these to a certain extent mimic some biological
mechanisms (e.g., parallel distributed processing, continuous
learning, and adaptation mechanisms, etc.). Yet even such
systems do not seem comfortably situated, or to want to ﬁt
in speciﬁc ecological niches, and neither have they adapted to
some speciﬁc dynamically changing informational resources –
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they did not ever evolve so as to act in order to survive,
reproduce, and so on, being designed instead just to simulate
certain human or animal actions (e.g., face recognition, language
production, decision making, etc.). If we still do not know
all the necessary and suﬃcient ingredients of consciousness
as a natural phenomenon, then certainly we know even less
about the feasibility of any artiﬁcial or machine consciousness
(Hollande, 2003; Torrance et al., 2007; Kurzweil, 2012; O’Regan,
2012).
Ultimately, however, it seems quite reasonable to restrict
graded consciousness to those systems capable of individuating
information and, on the basis of this, building subjective points of
view. We shall therefore propose the following global limitation
postulate: conscious experience can only be formed by unique
information detectors, i.e., individual systems. It is likely that only
dynamically changing biological or biologically based systems,
evolved and situated somewhere on Earth (or some Earth-like
ecosystem), meet these criteria. Earthly creatures (Millikan, 2004,
p. 44) are able to form individuated informational states which
may become conscious at a certain point in the processing that
goes on. Our aim in the next section will therefore be to analyze
this process more precisely, in the hope of establishing some
relevant local constraints on graded consciousness.
Selection and Local Limitations
If, as was suggested earlier, not all information detected by a
given organism and integrated within its specialized subsystems
(e.g., primary sensory areas) is ultimately conscious, then there
must be certain mechanisms according to which conscious states
are selected. Many hypotheses and empirical ﬁndings concerning
selection mechanisms at cognitive and neuronal levels have been
put forward in science. One of the more promising correlations
links consciousness with novel, non-standard or incongruent
information (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Mudrik et al., 2014).
In this context, conscious systems may be seen as speciﬁed
diﬀerence detectors and conscious information may indeed be
understood as ‘diﬀerences that make a diﬀerence’ – which is to
concur with IIT. Roughly put, when the diﬀerence is ‘spotted,’
neuroplasticity switches on; new associations of neurons are
formed and readied to discriminate similar states more eﬃciently
in the future, increasing adaptation, survival rates, and so on.
(Hence it is that learning andmemory are often considered crucial
functions for consciousness. See also Cleeremans (2011) and
Frith (2011). Of course, not all discernible diﬀerences are equally
likely to be detected: the system turns its attention to emotionally,
contextually, or perceptually primed contents or stimuli (thus
attention is also regarded as crucial – see Lamme, 2006). Yet
according to Lamme (2006), the phenomenon of consciousness
cannot be fully understood just in terms of one function or
another: what we should rather be looking for is the speciﬁc
neuronal mechanism responsible for generating consciousness.
Theoretical proposals and empirical models of neuronal
selection most often explore the idea of multiple parallel
processes distributed throughout the brain structures that
selectively generate states of consciousness (in diverse
conﬁgurations and diﬀerent activity patterns). The proposals in
question include the Global Workspace Theory (GWT; Baars,
1994; Baars et al., 2013), the Dynamic Core theory or theory
of neuronal group selection (DC; Edelman and Tononi, 2000;
Edelman, 2003; Edelman et al., 2011), the Recurrent Processing
model (RP; Lamme, 2006), the Global Neuronal Workspace
(GNW; Dehaene et al., 1998; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011), or
Semantic Pointer Competition (SPC; Thagard and Steward, 2014).
Borrowing some of their theoretical vocabulary, the process may
roughly be described as follows (based on sensory perception):
When the sensory information passes a certain detection
threshold, action potentials in the relevant feedforward neuronal
networks are ﬁred, enabling one to discern basic features
of the sensing scene (crucial for possible motor responses).
Later on in the process, longer-lasting activations of higher
and lower sensory areas result in the integration of particular
aspects of the information into perceptual objects (i.e., localized
re-entrant or recurrent processing). The neuronal activity may
then propagate itself onto more distant corticothalamic regions,
binding these together into wide-ranging ﬁring clusters (semantic
pointers, re-entrant loops) that may integrate sensory, motor, and
executive fronto-parietal areas. The group that forms recurrent,
synchronized activity inside such a DC ultimately wins the
competition or ‘survives’ the process of neuronal selection,
‘governing’ the neuronal workspace for a given length of time
(about 100–200 ms, in fact).
It is worth noting that the abovementioned models tend
to imply a fairly late and sudden acquisition of consciousness
occurring when some particular higher-order cortical activity
occurs either more globally (GW, GNW, SPC) or less so (DC,
RP), in the corticothalamic complex. However, they also reveal
certain features that may incline one toward favoring the graded
and extended view advocated here (ones also compatible, to
a certain extent, with the ideas of IIT; see Tononi and Koch,
2014). For example, in the RP model proposed in Lamme (2006),
recurrent activations that operate at a localized corticothalamic
level may count as preconscious, or perhaps as conscious but
not reportable. The primary consciousness conception introduced
in Edelman (2003) and Edelman et al. (2011) goes even further
in this direction, as it is supposed to be shared by most of the
animal world and to precede all higher forms of consciousness
(associated with re-entrant loops connecting certain memorized
emotional values with current sensory inputs). Moreover, in
what SPC proposes, consciousness is thought to be signiﬁcantly
extended globally, being associated there with species of gradually
diminished complexity in respect of neuronal structure (Thagard
and Steward, 2014, p. 79). However, the authors rather arbitrarily
assume that ﬁsh are the least developed creature possessing
consciousness). In addition, the biologically justiﬁed picture of
consciousness described in recent versions of the GW model
(Baars, 2005, 2012; Baars et al., 2013) is also signiﬁcantly extended
globally.
Are we likely to discover mechanisms responsible for selecting
states of consciousness amongst some of the lower-level forms
of neuronal activity, possibly in the primary sensory and
motor areas? Is there any fundamental diﬀerence between
widespread re-entrant connections and more localized recurrent,
or even feedforward, ﬁrings – except, of course, for their
varied spatiotemporal extent, directedness, frequencies, and/or
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underlying molecular mechanisms? The quantitative methods
proposed by IIT may show which of the activity patterns
diﬀerentiates and integrates more information (Tononi, 2008,
2010; Barrett and Seth, 2011), but since not all integrated
information need be conscious (see above and Mudrik et al.,
2014), another ingredient will be needed as a basis for the
selection. At the same time, however, outside of the varied
neuronal characteristics and functional results, we are rather
unlikely to ﬁnd that extra ingredient in the activation patterns
themselves. Just putting the matter very roughly, it may be said
that widespread re-entrant activations are most likely reportable
(when connections reach prefrontal areas), and more localized
recurrent processing will facilitate the formation of perceptual
objects (percepts), whilst feedforward sweep ‘just’ enables the
extraction of basic information necessary for fast motor responses
(e.g., location, motion, shape, depth, and color). Nevertheless,
the decision as to which of the mechanisms ultimately starts
to ‘generate’ consciousness in its most rudimentary forms (as
its true neural correlate or NCC; see Metzinger, 2000; Noë and
Thompson, 2004; Lamme, 2006; Hohwy, 2009) seems always
more or less arbitrary, being determined in due course by certain
functional assumptions as to whether the subject is able to react
appropriately, to diﬀerentiate, to learn, to choose, to decide, to
recall, to report, etc.
Is it possible, we may ask, to point to any other, perhaps
more general, non-neuronal process that might shape selection,
avoiding at the same time any arbitrary conclusions about the
exact cognitive function or neuronal mechanisms involved? In
other words, what might the general diﬀerence be between
informational and conscious states? The fundamental features
of consciousness described earlier in the text, understood
as abstract meta-characteristics (categories of more detailed
features), are good candidates as starting points for this
search. Conscious states, according to those four features,
are dually accessible (subjectively and objectively), referential
(about something), bodily determined (produced by the subject’s
physical body interacting with the environment), and useful
in action (pragmatically functional for a given subject). The
question now is this: which of these features are shared by
all informational states, and which constitute the diﬀerentia
speciﬁca of consciousness? According to the global limitation
postulate, consciousness may be engendered only by systems able
to individuate information. Therefore, all informational states
relevant to consciousness must be individuated and subjective,
though not all of them need ultimately be conscious. (This last
point in turn raises the issue of unconscious subjectivity – a
problem that calls for further analysis elsewhere; see Neisser,
2006). Conscious states, as selected-informational states, must
share this constitutive ingredient; hence, all “consciousness is
essentially subjective” (Searle, 1992, pp. 20–21; also Searle, 2000a,
pp. 561–570). Both informational and conscious states are not
just internally discernible for a given individual system, but
also potentially visible to an external observer (e.g., as certain
forms of neuronal activity or behavior): in this sense, both
are dually (subjectively and objectively) accessible, even if not
accessed at a given moment of time. Things are similar in the
case of referentiality, since all the discernible diﬀerences that go
to make up informational and conscious states must possess
certain content, must be ‘about something’ if they are to be
diﬀerentiated from one another. (Referential content may exhibit
a sensory, emotional, perceptual, or any other sort of character –
not necessarily one constitutive of any particular object). To the
extent that all informational states are individuated in virtue of
being detected by a speciﬁcally situated individual body engaged
in unique environmental interactions, bodily determination
should deﬁnitely also be considered a common feature. The
ﬁnal candidate for playing the role of a general diﬀerentiating
element here would seem to be pragmatic functionality. The
hypothesis that conscious states are selected from informational
states by virtue of their usefulness in action certainly seems quite
viable, so can pragmatic usability furnish us with a diﬀerentia
speciﬁca?
It is a trivial consequence of the mechanisms of evolution that
a given creature will be better equipped to detect states if these
resemble those that commonly proved useful for its ancestors. It
is also evident from the perspective of developmental psychology
and neuroscience that within biologically primed capacities for
detecting this rather than that occurrence, once again, the most
likely to be used are those states and action patterns resembling
the ones that proved most useful during the relevant individual
history. So we may assert that informational states are already
pragmatically preselected by a given creature’s phylogenetic and
ontogenetic history, and in that case it must also be rather trivially
true to say that the ongoing selection process which ultimately
leads to consciousness is pragmatically driven in general: i.e., that
it is oriented toward selecting from the actions available to a given
creature in response to moment-to-moment conditions. In this
sense, the real, in vivo selecting of states to become gradually
more conscious must be shaped by the actual situational context,
emotional values, and internal/external conditions that a given
system is in. We may add that the selection mechanisms indeed
seem to operate as if their aim were to answer the question
‘What can I actually do, having this information?’ rather than
the question ‘What do I know?’ (Here we might well wish to
invoke such terms as aﬀordances, contingencies, or expectations;
see Gibson, 1977, 1979; O’Regan et al., 2006; Noë, 2006, 2010).
Consequently, in this context, the assumption that the major role
of consciousness is to govern or coordinate action at a given
moment of time seems really quite viable, and in the light of
this we can propose the following local limitation postulate: that
conscious states are informational states selected to coordinate
action at a given moment in time.
Consciousness, Information, and Action
Putting together the global and local limitation postulates just
proposed, it seems that the aim of the present paper could
after all be fulﬁlled, and an abstract concept of consciousness
arrived at. This conception will concur with the general idea
of IIT about the informational nature of conscious states and
the graded nature of consciousness (Tononi and Koch, 2014).
However, the extended range of graded forms of consciousness
will be conﬁned to individual systems (i.e., structurally unique,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1035
Jonkisz Consciousness: individuated information in action
situated creatures, able to individuate information and adapt
their actions to changing conditions), whereas diﬀerentiated
informational states available within a given system are thought
to undergo pragmatically driven, action-oriented, complex
processes of selection and become, in due course, gradually more
conscious. Consequently, consciousness may be characterized
quite straightforwardly here: as a phenomenon in which a
given individual system utilizes information in action. Put more
succinctly, consciousness is individuated information utilized
in action. Of course, such an abstract conception needs to
be interpreted in the light of the distinctions and analyses
developed here – ones that right from the very beginning have
involved the concept of individuated information (characterized
as evolutionarily embedded and/or socially altered and subjectively
grounded) and a recognition of the fundamental features
of consciousness (i.e., dual accessibility, referentiality, bodily
determination, usefulness in action).
Translating the proposal into more practical terms, it may
be said that conscious states consist of all possible sensory,
perceptual, emotional, and other (kinds of) contents, selected
from internally and/or externally induced informational states
(diﬀerentiated and integrated in memory-based, sensory, or any
other relevant subsystems of a given organism). The contents
are selected to coordinate and adapt divergent actions to the
speciﬁc conditions of the moment: they are utilized, for example,
to grasp objects, to navigate motion, to see, to taste, to react
appropriately, to decide, to reason, to think, to talk, to read, to
answer questions, and so on. Conscious contents actually arise
in the very acting process in which diﬀerent components of
actions (i.e., diﬀerent interacting neuronal and bodily structures)
show up as being, in a gradational sense, more or less conscious
(leading in turn to a more global kind of task-related integration).
Such interacting structures may refer, for example, to speciﬁc
visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, or inner-bodily
sensations, or to emotional feels, or to the location of certain
objects in the surroundings, along with their usability, purpose
or name, or to co-relations between things and other creatures,
or similar past experiences, remembered events and situations,
actual thoughts, ideas, concepts, words, phrases, meanings,
beliefs, and so on. The degree to which the subject becomes aware
of a given content (order of consciousness) is determined by
a variety of heterogeneous factors, including general situational
and emotional context, the applicability of a given action, the
complexity and novelty of the informational states utilized in it,
the spatiotemporal range of some given stimuli and the strength
of the neuronal activations induced – to name just a few of
the possibilities (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Overgaard et al.,
2006, 2010; Mudrik et al., 2014).
Acting in a complex and dynamically changing environment,
biological creatures are potentially able to diﬀerentiate between
an inﬁnite number of states; there can be no doubt that such
overloaded informational conditions and such an ever-changing
environment would have exerted evolutionary pressure, favoring
more eﬃcient selection mechanisms and greater plasticity in
acting. The hypothesis that individuated information (with
already preselected and subjective states) and consciousness (with
action-speciﬁc state selection) are adaptive responses to those
‘needs’ seems plausible and consistent with the general scientiﬁc
picture. The functional role of consciousness implied by this view
may be described as that of providing online integration and
reﬁnement (adaptation) of available actions in accordance with
the changing conditions of the moment. As far as we know, such
pragmatically driven processes are most likely probabilistic and
heuristic in nature (i.e., experience-based), and rather fallible or
susceptible for error, yet nevertheless remain eﬃcient enough to
have persisted (Lotto and Purves, 2002; Rossano, 2003; Lotto,
2004). From this perspective, consciousness may be understood
as yet another biological adaptation – a pragmatically functional
process that enables the forming of unique patterns of action
coordinated and reﬁned on the basis of the private informational
states available to a given agent.
Consequences and Conclusion
As was argued earlier, one of the characteristic features
of conscious states is their referentiality (i.e., being about
something). Some of the states, namely higher-order or
metacognitive ones, refer to other, namely lower-order, states
or contents. In most of the cases, however, a given subject is
metacognitively unaware of the particular information utilized
in action; economy and eﬃciency of acting dictate that most of
the informational states will go metacognitively unnoticed, being
impossible to report for the subject. For example, walking up a
hill we are not aware of most of the complex equilibrioceptive
information that our body uses in order to maintain balance
(we just naturally incline into the slope). Perhaps the most
controversial claim supported in this article is that even
such forms of information, commonly regarded as genuinely
unconscious, count as a rudimentary form of consciousness
(namely sensorimotor consciousness) insofar as they are utilized
for the purpose of acting. To put it simply, we are our bodies,
so if our body ‘knows,’ then we know; in most cases it is
just that we do not know that we know. One would probably
argue that although such sensorimotor information is accessible
to the subject, there is ‘nothing it is like to have it’ – no
subjective experience in it, no qualia. There is insuﬃcient space
to analyze the complicated problem of qualia here (for that
purpose, see Dennett, 1988; Crane, 2000; Bayne, 2009), but it
is in fact subjectivity that is crucial in this context. The notion
of individuated information developed in the present article
thus furnishes at least a provisional answer to this objection.
It proposes a naturalized conception of subjectivity itself –
one based on the uniqueness of biological systems and their
individual diﬀerences. Extending the analogy just deployed, it
may thus be added that we are each of us not ‘any-body’: we
are, rather, particular, individual bodies, so that no other body
could ever ‘know’ anything in exactly the same way that our
body does (in that all information accessible within the biological
system is individuated). Ultimately, insofar as consciousness is
‘individuated information utilized in action’ by a given creature,
what-it-is-like to have individuated information means what-it-
is-like for a subject to act (where acting feels a certain way for the
subject or is subjectively experienced as such).
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In many philosophical theories (e.g., Rosenthal, 1986;
Lycan, 1996; Gennaro, 2005) and dichotomous neurocognitive
models (Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011),
consciousness is associated exclusively with certain higher-order
metacognitive or reportable states. Except for certain problems
and empirical shortcomings (mentioned earlier), such a position
also brings the aim of the science of consciousness down
to the level of a quest for a certain speciﬁc mechanism of
generation or, at least, a contrastive threshold between higher-
order conscious and lower-order unconscious states. The graded,
action-oriented approach developed in this article oﬀers a
pragmatic explanation of why there may not be any contrastive
diﬀerence between conscious and unconscious processes at
the neuronal level (see Peremen and Lamy, 2014). The quest
for a kind of ‘magic button’ that ‘switches the light on’ in
some way or other may be altogether misleading, as the claim
that consciousness does not arise suddenly is empirically well
justiﬁed (as was shown above). According to the view supported
here, consciousness shows up in the way in which living
systems interact with the world using internal and external
information (in this context, see also O’Regan and Noë, 2001;
Noë and Thompson, 2004; Noë, 2006, 2010). It builds up
gradually in the individual interacting system so that, at a
certain point, the system may become able to report on the
contents of its own states, yet this does not mean that it has
just acquired consciousness while previously having been totally
unconscious.
This gradational, action-oriented view also has certain
methodological consequences. For example, it is deﬁnitely
more diﬃcult in experimental practice to ﬁnd evidence for
consciousness at lower levels of functioning – in this case,
more sensitive measuring methods and tools are needed. If
consciousness is indeed to be action-oriented, then perhaps
certain quite new action-oriented measuring procedures will
also need to be developed. At the same time, the gradational
view does not call for a methodological revolution: for instance,
contrastive analysis might also be useful here (when the contrast
or threshold is properly deﬁned and detectable). The change,
rather, is above all meta-theoretical, because the thresholds
or contrasts used in experiments are to be seen more as
operational or practical than as deﬁnite. Other implications
that could have a bearing on methodology might relate to
the more holistic and externalistic approach needed when
seeking to explain graded consciousness. A reasonable piece
of advice in this respect would be to locate one’s methodology
somewhere in between out-of-body experiences and locked-
in syndrome (if, that is, we may be permitted to paraphrase
the radically externalistic and internalistic methodologies
by invoking these well-known states of impairment; see
Jonkisz, 2012). It is probably enough just to go ‘out of
our heads’ (Noë, 2010), toward the most important bodily
determinants of consciousness, albeit without necessarily
dismissing the fact of the ‘brain’s causal priority’ (Bickle, 2008,
p. 272).
Certain consequences of the abstract concept of consciousness
developed in this article might prove more signiﬁcant viewed
from a metaphysical perspective, but as detailed analysis is
not feasible in this closing section, a few such implications
will just be brieﬂy indicated below. Consciousness, understood
as ‘individuated information in action,’ is ubiquitous in the
animal world: it is deﬁnitely not restricted to humans, or to
mammals, as its lowest orders might be exhibited by virtually
any living system able tomake non-random use of environmental
information in its actions. What is more, the phenomenon seems
to be fundamentally divided epistemologically (because dually
accessible), yet can still be, and hopefully is, ontologically uniﬁed.
In the account developed here, consciousness may be seen as
implied by or bound to the unique physical structure of any active
system that individuates information.
Instead of oﬀering further conclusions, let us end by listing
a small number of questions and problems potentially raised
by this conception. With such a broad notion of consciousness
in play, does the traditional distinction between consciousness
and unconsciousness still hold valid? Is it possible for a given
creature to act without being conscious, or is acting always
information-based, and hence to a certain degree conscious?
Is it possible to invent certain criteria for ‘individuation’ in
order, for example, to determine whether artiﬁcial systems could
possibly ever individuate information? How can information be
subjective (i.e., individuated) yet not conscious (i.e., not used in
action)? What do we mean exactly by ‘action’? Questions such as
these, prompted as they are by the conception of consciousness
as ‘individuated information in action’ outlined here, certainly
merit a discussion of their own.
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